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STATE OF UTAH 1 • 
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JOHNNIE M. 
BRUCE C. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL 
ANALYSIS OR TO ALTERNATIVELY 
DISMISS THE ACTION. 
In appellant's brief, the following claim is made: 
Appellant contends that the act of 
leaving his blood specimens at room tempera-
ture is tantamount to destroying those samples. 
Appellant's brief, at p. 19. 
This contention is not supported by any evidence or 
testimony in the record yet appellant uses the bold assumption 
to develop an argument of a prejudicial destruction and/or 
suppression of evidence in violation of the holding of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed2d 215 [1963). 
Respondent urges that such a conclusion is not only 
unwarranted by the absence of such evidence in the record, but a 
careful review of relevant statutes and case law also reveals 
that appellant's reliance on destruction and suppression of evidence 
and duty to disclose cases is misplaced. 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10 [d) (Supp. 1977) indicates 
that where a person suspected of driving under the influence of 
alcohol has had his blood tested for alcohol content, 
Upon the request of the person who was 
tested, the results of such test or tests 
shall be made available to him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Thus, in the area of blood alcohol testing specific 
variations from traditional evidence disclosure principles are 
present. In the above quoted statute, the accused must make a 
specific request for the results of the tests made on his blood. 
If such a request is not made, or is made untimely (see infra), 
then the State is under no duty to make even the test "results" 
available to the accused, let alone the blood alcohol samples 
themselves. 
Another statute further amplifies this duty on an accuse: 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 .10 (f) (Supp. 1977) states: 
The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choosing 
administer a chemical test in addition to the 
test or tests administered at the direction of 
a peace officer. The failure or inability to 
obtain such additional test shall not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or 
tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, 
nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be 
taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
Such additional test shall be subsequent to the 
test or tests administered at the direction of 
a peace officer. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, appellant, by statute, is accorded the clear 
opportunity to have a separate, independent analysis done on 
his blood by a physician of his own choosing. Yet, his failure 
to do so will not bar the admissibility of the test results 
obtained by the arresting officers. Yet, appellant claims that 
if the blood samples taken at the request of the state are not 
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reserved for him so that he may later conduct an independent 
analysis of the same samples, then the state's samples should be 
rendered inadmissible. This logic defies the clear intent and 
language of Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10 (f) supra, and is directly 
contrary to Utah law and respondent urges the court to reject it. 
Several states have dealt with the question of whether 
a defendant's preclusion (for whatever reason) from running a 
post-test on a breathalyzer ampoule or blood alcohol sample should 
require the exclusion of the State's test result. In State v. 
Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 332, 487 P.2d 399 (1971), the Supreme 
Court of Arizona was faced with this question. There, the state 
was unable to produce the test ampoule for inspection and re-testing 
by defendant since the state had discarded the ampoule "pursuant 
to standard procedure." 487 P.2d at 400. In establishing the 
requirement with which the defendant had to comply in order to 
suppress the admission of the State's test result, the Arizona 
Court ruled that the defendant 
. must show how the production of 
the requested evidence would aid in the 
presentation of his defense. In the instant 
case [defendant] has failed to show how the 
post test chemical composition of the test 
ampoule, had it not been discarded, could have 
made a valid contribution to his defense. 
487 P.2d at 401 
Since the defendant in Superior Court could not meet 
the burden of showing how the post-test would have aided in his 
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defense, the court rejected the motion to suppress and remanded 
the case for trial. 
This re~uirement was restated later by the Arizona 
Court of Appeals in State v. Canter, 116 Ar:z. 356, 569 P.2d 298 
(1977): 
Our Supreme Court rejected the contention 
that due process requires the State to produce 
the ampule for testing in State v. Superior Court, 
[supra] and therein ruled that a defendant must 
make a prior showing that the requested evidence 
would aid in his case before the trial court can 
order production. In that case as in this one 
there was no prior showing made by the defendant. 
116 Ariz. at 358. 
That defendants must make such a showing is also a 
holding of People v. Hedrick, 557 P. 2d 378 (Colo., 1976). There, 
the Colorado Supreme Court applied the Brady v. Maryland, supra, 
test to the question of post-test analysis by defendants. The 
court noted that the Brady test:. 
• . asks the questions: 1) 
whether the evidence was suppressed by the 
prosecution after a request by the defense; 
2) whether the evidence is favorable to the 
defense, i. e., exculpatory in nature; and 
3) whether the evidence is material. 
* * * 
The defendant in the case at bar has 
failed to meet any of the three prongs of 
the test, all three of which must be met 
in order to support an argument that there 
has been a denial of due process. 
-29d-
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The first factor to be considered 
is whether there has been a suppression of 
evidence by the prosecution and, if so, 
whether such suppression took place after a 
request by the defense for the evidence. 
There was no evidence here that the test 
as given could have been preserved. The 
request for a breath sample was first made 
through the defendant's "Motion to Produce," 
many months after the defendant was arrested 
and the breath test taken. 
There is no claim that the alleged 
failure to have a sample available was deliber-
ate. 
* * * Herein there simply was no evidence in 
this record that there was suppression or 
non-disclosure of evidence by the prosecution 
and we therefore do not reach to the other 
factors. 
* * * In summary, where there is a failure, as 
here, to prove that the evidence is preserv-
able or that there was any prejudice to defendant 
by failure to have available to him a breath 
sample, we must hold that the wider interests 
of society favor the admissibility of the test 
results at trial. 
557 P.2d at 380-382 
Some jurisdictions have required that a defendant meet 
this burden of showing the exculpatory evidence present in a 
post-test by use of expert witnesses. In State v. Teare, 135 
N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (1975) where!!£ expert had testified, 
the court, on the State's appeal of the suppression order, re-
manded for a thorough development of the issues involved. On 
the second appeal, the court ruled as follows: 
-29e-
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Based on the testimony and evidence presented 
at this hearing the court finds as fact: 
1 .. It is presently impossible to preserve 
the breathalyzer ampules so as to reliably elimin-
ate all the factors which cause unpredictable 
changes in the ampule contents subsequent to the 
administering of the breathalyzer test. 
2. The reactions begun inside the ampule 
by the original breathalyzer test continue in 
an unpredictable and uncontrollable manner. 
These unpredictable reactions cause subsequent 
analysis or retesting of the ampule to be totally 
unreliable evidence as a check on the accuracy 
or validity of the original breathalyzer test. 
3. There is no predictable relationship 
to the changes that occur within the test ampule 
and the passage of time. 
4. At the present time subsequent retesting 
or chemical analysis of the test ampules provides 
no acceptable scientific relationship to the 
accuracy or validity of the original test results. 
5. The theory of Dr. Volpe and the experi-
mentation of Dr. Jones have not been thoroughly 
tested or scientifically scrutinized as to be 
considered acceptable as scientific fact or 
accurate enough to produce results admissible 
as evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Preservation of the test ampule is not 
feasible or practical since subsequent testing 
will not give any scientifically reliable results, 
this being due to the uncontrollable changes that 
occur in the breathalyzer test ampules after 
their use in the breathalyzer test. Furthermore, 
even if these changes or variations could be 
scientifically accounted for and accurately 
analyzed, you still could not properly analyze 
a test ampule subsequent to a breathalyzer t~st 
because there is simply no predictable relation-
ship between the changes that occur and the lapse 
of time. 
342 A.2d at 558. 
-29f-
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Respondent makes no claim as to the similarities 
between breathalyzer tests and blood tests. It may well be that 
the above discussed "impossibility," "unpredictability" and 
"uncontrollable" problems that exist in breathalyzer t.ests are 
generally applicable to blood sample re-testing. But the important 
point is the requirement seen in Teare that expert testimony must 
be given in order for a defendant to establish the necessity of 
his post-test claims. Defendants, though, often find such 
expert testimony damaging to their position. 
In People v. Stark, 73 Mich. App. 332, 251 N.E.2d 574 
(1977), for example, an expert witness testified that in only 
~ of the 200 ampoule retesting that he had conducted had he 
found any significant variation in the results of the first test 
and the later one. He also admitted that used ampoules are of 
little value after 30 days. (In Stark the defendant had waited 
72 days before requesting the ampoule for retesting.) 
So rigidly does Oregon hold to the requirement of expert 
witness testimony to support a defendant's claim, that in State v. 
~. 550 P.2d 1403 (Ore., 1976) the court ruled that the 
defendant had not made the necessary showing of the value to 
him of retesting the ampoule, even though in State v. Michener, 
550 P. 2d 449 (Ore., 1976) (decided just 20 days before Reaves) 
the court ruled that the defendant had properly showed how the 
-29g-
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retesting would be to his benefit and the State's evidence was 
therefore, suppressed. 
, 
Another ·important aspect that should be emphasized is 
that where the "destruction" of evidence is not done maliciously 
or in an effort to subvert defendant's case, courts have been 
unwilling to suppress the State's evidence or dismiss charges. 
In State v. Watson, 4B Ohio App. 2d 110, 355 N.E. 2d 8B3 (1975) 
the court held: 
. where there is no evidence that the 
ampoule and solution, if preserved, could be 
scientifically examined so as to produce conclu-
sive results, nor that is was maliciously destroyed, 
the results of the breathalyzer test may be 
admitted. 
355 N.E.2d at 8B5 (Emphasis added.) 
This view was also followed in State v. Myers, 
BB N.W. 16, 536 P.2d 2BO (1975). 
It should be noted at this point that 
the sample was exhausted by the state in the 
conduct of its tests, so that no part of it 
remained for the defendant to test. 
The court will not adopt a construction 
of a statute which will lead to unreasonable 
results. The record shows neither intent on 
the part of the state to destroy evidence nor 
any negligence by the state since all the blood 
was used in the tests conducted. The statute 
cannot insulate defendant "against the "slings 
and arrows of outrageous fortune", which may 
strike anyone at any time and are unfortunately 
incidental to life itself." United States v. 
Pate, 31B F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1963); Nunn v. Cupp, 
15 Or.App. 212, 515 P.2d 421 (1973). 
-29h-
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We conclude that the results of the 
state's tests were admissible regardless 
of the fact that defendant had no opportunity 
to test the sample. 
526 P.2d at 284, 
In accord, People v. Hedrick, supra; State v. Superior 
~· supra; and State v. Canter, supra. 
A related issue to the question of maliciously destroyed 
evidence, as noted in appellant's brief, is that of lost or 
accidently destroyed evidence. In In Interest of Oaks, 571 
P.2d 1364 (Utah, 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, noted 
that the admission of blood alcohol data would have been proper 
in that case "even if the ampoule were lost or destroyed." 
571 P.2d at 1365. 
The fact that evidence of this nature is often-times 
destroyed according to normal operating procedures has also 
been acknowledged by several courts. Foy v. State, 533 P.2d 634 
(Okla., 1974); State v. Myers, supra; State v. Superior Court, 
supra; and State v. Canter, supra. 
Another consideration courts have found to be of 
relevance (as above noted) is the issue of timely request for 
the independent, post-test. In People v. Hedrick, supra, the 
defendant "made a motion to produce the breath sample" (557 
P.2d at 379) nearly three months after the State had run its 
breathalyzer test. This factor, combined with defendant's failure 
-29i-
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to show that the test sample could have been preserved to enable 
him to conduct a later analysis, persuaded the court to allow 
the State to admit the evidence. In accord, State v. canter, 
supra. 
The same dilatory, tardy request is present in the 
instant matter and respondent submits that the result seen in 
Hedrick and Canter therefore is the result .this court should 
also follow. 
A tangentially-related issue to the admission of such 
evidence is that routinely - conducted tests, just as records 
kept in the regular course of business, are properly admitted. 
Here, respondent contends that the blood tests conducted by 
Lynn Davis were done in the ordinary course of his employment and 
therefore the reliability of the tests, in the first instance, 
must be deemed to be high. (See Sullivan v. Municipality 
of Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070 (Alaska, 1978) and Utah Rules of 
Evidence 63 (13) and (15)). 
Some courts have also ruled that where ample evidence 
was presented by the prosecution of defendant's intoxication, 
separate from any blood alcohol tests, the courts refused to 
overturn defendant;s conviction even were the tests to be 
I 
excluded. (See Foy v. State, supra and People v. Hedrick, ~·' 
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One last consideration made in the Hedrick case is the 
public policy agreement that "the people [State) have no duty to 
give the defendant any chemical test." 557 P.2d at 379. The 
~ court then quoted favorably from State v. Reyera, 92 
Idaho 669, 448 P. 2d 762 (1968): 
To hold otherwise would be to transform 
the accused's right to due process into a power 
to compel the State to gather in the accused's 
behalf what might be exculpatory evidence. In 
this case, the State produced testimonial evi-
dence of intoxication, but it had no obligation 
to obtain for appellant what he speculates might 
have been more scientific evidence of sobriety. 
The State may not suppress evidence, but it need 
not gather evidence for the accused. 
448 P.2d at 767 
In summary, therefore, appellant has not satisfied 
either statutory or case law duties of timely requesting a post-
test; meeting his burden of showing the exculpatory nature of a 
retest; use of expert witnesses to show the "destruction" has 
actually occurred and that the "destruction" was malicious or, 
at least, greater than accidental and not routinely destroyed; 
and convincingly shown that the state should "gather evidence for 
the accused." Therefore, respondent submits that the blood test 
results were properly admitted and that the appellant's motion 
to suppress the test results was properly denied. 
Dated this 13th day of September, 1979. 
~£,~ .. ;.,__, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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